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PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF THE
MENTALLY DISABLED IN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
THE RIGHT TO LEGAL REPRESENTATION
ROBERT T. DRAPKIN*
Mental illness is measured by the presence or lack of
characteristics common to normally functioning individuals.
Such characteristics include an adequate perception of reality,
an ability to control one's own behavior, productivity, an ability
to control oneself, self-esteem, an ability to have affectionate
relationships, and self knowledge.1 The characteristics are what
enable us as individuals to carry out day to day activities and to
deal with everyday life. The fewer characteristics a person
possesses the more severe the mental disability, and thus, the
lesser capacity to carry out the simplest day to day tasks. In
response to the difficulties encountered by mentally disabled
individuals, the government introduced Home Relief (HR)2,
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), 3 and Supplemental
Security Income (SSI)4 public benefit programs. Despite the
government's initiative, however, it seems that eligible
individuals are not receiving benefits. It is asserted that the
process by which benefits are obtained is difficult and complex,
thus making the application process undesirable. In order to
Robert T. Drapkin is a practicing attorney in New York City.
1 RITA L. ATKINSON, ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY 618 (11th ed.
1993).
2 42 U.S.C.A § 1382 (West Supp. 1997); see also Peter Kihss, City Studies Home
Relief Recipients, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1982, at 36 (describing Home Relief as "a
catchall category of welfare in which costs are shared equally by the state and city,
with no contribution from the Federal Government. Most recipients are employable
childless adults...").
s See 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
4 See 42 U.S.C. § 405 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
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facilitate the availability of public benefits, mentally ill
individuals should be assigned guardians ad litem.5
Since the earliest days of the common law, the legal rights of
those unable to protect themselves in judicial proceedings have
been protected by guardians ad litem.6 Today, in all American
jurisdictions, those who are unable to function in modern,
sophisticated, judicial settings are protected. 7  Despite the
absence of formal adversarial confrontations in administrative
adjudication, and some informality in the proceedings, the
growing complexity of the law and of society mandates that
protections be extended to recipients and applicants for benefits.
Consider, by way of example, the following typical, but not
actual, cases:
1. A retiree, functionally illiterate in English, applies for
Social Security benefits but is stymied by the difficulties of
obtaining a foreign birth certificate.
2. An elderly recipient of food stamps receives notice she
must recertify. She sets the notice aside, and forgets
where she puts it.
3. An elderly Alzheimer's patient lives alone in a public
housing project. Her granddaughter moves in ostensibly
5 "A guardian ad litem is a special guardian appointed by the court in which a
particular litigation is pending to represent an infant, ward or unborn person in
that particular litigation, and the status of guardian ad litem exists only in that
specific litigation in which the appointment occurs." BLACIVS LAW DICTIONARY 706
(6th ed. 1990).
6 Bracton, writing in the mid-thirteen century, notes the provision of tutors and
curators-offices derived from Roman law and corresponding roughly to guardians
of persons and property, respectively. For a litigant "insane or of unsound mind, so
that he knows not how to understand, or has no understanding at all, for such men
are not far removed from brute beasts, which lack reason." 4 BRACTON, ON THE
LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 308 (Woodbine ed. & Thorne trans., 1977).
Edward Coke, a late eighteen century commentator, wrote: "Also there was a time
when ideots, madmen, and such as were deafe and dumbe naturally, were disabled
to sue, because they wanted reason and understanding (tales enim non multum
disant a brutis). But at this day they all may sue; for the suit must be in their name,
but it shall be followed by others." 1 COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
135.
In the case of infants, guardians ad litem had their roots in equity. In the case
of incompetent adults, guardians ad litem had their roots in the ancient legal writ
de custodia admittendo. COKE, supra at 88b n. 16. A writ de custodia admittendo is a
"writ for admitting a guardian." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 412 (6th ed. 1990).
7 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 372 (Deering Supp. 1999); N.Y. C.P.L.R.
1201 (McKinney 1997); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, 2053 (West. Supp. 1999).
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to help her, but instead misappropriates her Social
Security checks to buy drugs. She supplements what she
steals from her grandmother with earnings from
prostitution. Notice is sent that an administrative hearing
will determine whether the tenancy should be terminated
on the grounds of chronic rent delinquency and on the
grounds that the elderly tenant permitted drug use and
prostitution in her apartment. The old lady defaults.
This article posits two new ideas. First, that guardians ad
litem are required for mentally disabled individuals in
administrative, as well as judicial proceedings. Second, because
no statute expressly provides for guardians ad litem, the
Constitution must.
I. DUE PROCESS8 REQUIREMENTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS--A FEw FUNDAMENTALS
By the turn of the century, administrative procedures were
subject to Due Process.9  In Yamataya v. Fisher,10 a case
involving administrative deportation proceedings, the Supreme
Court stated:
[Tihis court has never held, nor must we now be understood as
holding, that administrative officers, when executing the
provisions of a statute involving the liberty of persons, may
disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in 'due
process of law' as understood at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution."i
The landmark case Goldberg v. Kelly 12  established
governmental benefits as "property" within the ambit of Due
8 The Sixth Amendment states," In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI (emphasis added). As the Sixth Amendment is applicable in criminal
proceedings only, this article shall, despite some superficial resemblance of issues to
those under the right to counsel cases, proceed under Fifth Amendment Due Process
analysis only.
9 The Fifth Amendment, applicable to actions by the federal government,
states, in relevant part, "No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The applicability of Due
Process was extended to the states by the reconstruction era's Fourteenth
Amendment.
10 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
11 Id. at 100.
12 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
39 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 4
Process. The question presented was whether welfare recipients
were entitled to evidentiary hearings before an impartial
decision-maker prior to a termination of benefits. Analogizing
property law and property rights such as franchises, professional
licenses, farm subsidies, airline routes, and television channels,
which did not fall within traditional common-law concepts of
property, the court stated, "[iut may be realistic today to regard
welfare entitlements as more like 'property' than a 'gratuity.' "13
The court continued, "[sluch benefits are a matter of statutory
entitlement for persons qualified to receive them. Their
termination involves state action that adjudicates important
rights."14 The decision suggests that statutory public benefits
were a species of property protected by due process from
unwarranted governmental deprivation by due process.15
The next issue the court addressed was the extent to which
the recipient of public benefits must be afforded procedural due
process.1 6 The Court determined that the applicable standard of
review was to examine the extent to which an individual would
be "'condemned to suffer grievous loss.'"17 Grievous loss is
generally determined by holding evidentiary hearings prior to
terminating benefits.'8 Often, individuals left destitute because
of wrongful termination are deemed to have suffered a grievous
loss.
The Court noted the tension between the government's
interest in providing welfare as a means of preventing social
malaise and securing individual liberties, and the
"countervailing governmental interests in conserving fiscal and
administrative resources."19  The Court discounted the
13 Id. at 262 n.8.
14 Id. at 262.
15 See id. at 260-61.
16 See id. at 262-63.
17 Id. at 263 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
Is See id. at 264.
[TIermination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility
may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while
he waits. Since he lacks independent resources, his situation becomes
immediately desperate. His need to concentrate upon finding the means for
daily subsistence, in turn, adversely affects his ability to seek redress from
the welfare bureaucracy.
19 Id. at 265.
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government's interest, noting that the increased costs involved
in providing pre-termination hearings regarding welfare
termination could be minimized by "skillful use of personnel and
facilities."2 0
The Goldberg Court held that disabled individuals, like all
individuals are entitled to due process and must be afforded an
opportunity to be heard " 'at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.' "21 The hearing "must be tailored to the
capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard."22
The unfortunate downside is that " '[tihe prosecution of an
appeal demands a degree of security, awareness, tenacity, and
ability which few dependent people have.' "23 In response to the
special needs of the disabled, voluntary representation was
established.24  It is asserted, however, that the right to
representation is not sufficient protection, and that disabled
individuals need to be assigned counsel in order to adequately
protect their interests.
The rule of Goldberg v. Kelly was refined and limited by the
Supreme Court's subsequent ruling in Mathews v. Eldridge.25
The Court held that a disabled individual whose SSDI benefits
were being terminated was not entitled, as a matter of due
process, to a pre-termination evidentiary hearing of the type
required by Goldberg. The Court delineated a tripartite test to
determine the necessary procedures by which an administrative
agency could effect the termination of benefits.
The following factors are considered:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function
20 Id. at 266.
21 Id. at 267 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
22 Id. at 268-69. It is a thesis central to this article that at a certain level of
disability, where mentally ill persons are unable to meet the demands of complex
bureaucracies, unable to gather documents, meet deadlines, or attend hearings, only
notice to responsible third parties such as guardians ad litem can be meaningful.
23 See id. at 269 n.16 (quoting Wedemeyer & Moore, The American Welfare
System, 54 CAL. L. REV. 326, 342 (1966)).
2 See id. at 270.
2 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.26
In this instance, the Court found that due process did not
require a pre-termination evidentiary hearing-eligibility for
Disability Insurance benefits was not based on financial need,
and the recipient had other resources available, such as income
from other family members, insurance, pension, or savings.27
The Court focused on the first of the factors stated in its test,
holding that "[tihe potential deprivation here is generally likely
to be less than in Goldberg... .2s
While the courts have found due process violations where
mentally ill persons have been deprived of statutory public
benefits, and have ordered new administrative hearings
regarding the deprivation of property,29 they have declined to
appoint representation during such hearings. However, courts
have ordered that mentally ill prisoners, probationers, and
parolees be provided with representation in some types of
administrative disciplinary hearings prior to a proposed
administrative deprivation of liberty.30 To provide mentally ill
individuals with representation in only those limited
circumstances is inconsistent with the notion of due process. If
they are entitled to representation to protect their liberty
interests, they should also be entitled to representation to
protect their property interests in statutory entitlements.
26 Id. at 335; see also, e.g., American-Arab Anti-Discrimination v. Reno, 70 F.3d
1045, 1061 (9th Cir. 1995); Padilla-Agustin v. INS, 21 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1994);
Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1003 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing the Mathews v. Eldridge
test).
27 See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 340-41.
28 Id. at 341.
29 See, e.g., Parker v. Califano, 644 F.2d 1199, 1203 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding
that Due Process requires that administrative res judicata could not be raised
against a claimant who belatedly raised an issue of mental illness); Shrader v.
Harris, 631 F.2d 297, 302 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that denial of benefits to one
unable to prosecute a claim due to mental disability constituted a violation of due
process); see also infra Section III.
30 See infra Section Ill See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1980)
(holding that counsel should be provided to prisoners suffering from mental disease
when the state seeks to treat them as mentally ill).
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II. SOCIAL SECURITY TERMINATION CASES
The leading case in this area is Shrader v. Harris.31
Shrader, a Vietnam veteran, filed several times for SSDI based
on a service-related disability, and was denied each time. Each
time, he failed to follow the statutory appeals process. The
appeals process entitled the applicant to reconsideration of the
claim and an administrative hearing. Rather, the veteran filed
anew each time, alleging the same disability and onset date. He
was unrepresented.
On his fourth attempt to qualify for benefits, a decade after
his first application and denial, he alleged a psychiatric
disability. The alleged onset of the psychiatric disability pre-
dated the first application. He filed for reconsideration of his
denial this time, and the reconsideration was also denied.
Subsequently, he filed for a hearing before an Administrative
Law Judge (AUL). The ALJ dismissed the request for a hearing,
citing that res judicata applied to the previous applications, and
that Shrader was barred from re-litigating the issues he had
previously raised.
The court of appeals held that due process considerations
overrode the doctrine of administrative res judicata. The court
phrased the issue:
[Wihen mental illness precluded a pro se claimant from
understanding how to obtain an evidentiary hearing after ex
parte denial of his application for benefits, does the summary
dismissal on res judicata grounds of his motion for a hearing
with respect to a subsequent application deprive that claimant
of property without due process of law?32
The court progressed sequentially through the tripartite
Mathews v. Eldridge analysis. First, it held that the private
interest involved was significant. If the administrative decision
were permitted to stand, it would deprive Shrader of all Social
Security benefits.33 Second, it held that the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of benefits would be high if the ex parte decision
were to stand, as he would be denied a de novo evidentiary
hearing34 on the issue of whether his "mental condition
31 631 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1980)
32 Id. at 301.
33 See id.
34 See id.
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prevented him from understanding the administrative process
for appealing his prior claims and the consequences of his failure
to pursue this process during the course of his pro se
applications."35 Third, the court held that the government's
burden during the hearing would be slight.36 The government
would be prevented from raising the issue of administrative res
judicata only where the claimant raised issues of mental
disability to pursue his claim during the period when the bar
became effective. If the claim was made without holding an
evidentiary hearing on the issue of the disability, and if a
disability was found, then an evidentiary hearing would be held
on the merits of the claim. 37 Thus, for the first time, a court
decided that the denial of benefits to one unable to prosecute a
claim due to mental disability constituted a violation of Due
Process.
Without citing Shrader, the Sixth Circuit independently
reached the same conclusion in Parker v. Califano.38 In Parker,
the court also held that Due Process required that
administrative res judicata could not be raised against a
claimant who belatedly raised an issue of mental illness.39
Other circuit courts of appeal have decided cases in
accordance with Shrader and Parker.40 No court of appeals has
35 Id. at 302-03.
36 See id. at 302.
37 See id.
38 644 F.2d 1199 (6th Cir. 1981).
39 See id. at 1203. The court defined the issue and held as follows:
The claim presented here by Parker alleges, in effect, that it is a denial of
due process for a claimant to be precluded from litigating her claim for
benefits because of a failure to proceed in a timely fashion from one
administrative stage to the next when the claimant did not receive
meaningful notice and the opportunity to be heard. The alleged defect in
notification does not concern the content of the standard notices, which
were admittedly mailed and received, but relates to the ability of the
claimant to understand and act upon them. Parker's contention is that,
because she did not have the mental ability to understand and comply with
the notice of further administrative procedures, she did not receive
meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard .... We think Parker
presents a colorable argument that she failed to understand and act upon
the notice she received because of her mental condition, and that a denial
of benefits based upon this failure is a denial of due process.
Id. at 1203.
40 See, e.g., Evans v. Chater, 110 F.3d 1480 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the
plaintiffs due process claim because his mental condition did not impede his ability
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failed to recognize the doctrine. The issue has not been before
the Supreme Court.
Many circuit cases involve situations where an
administrative decision is reopened on constitutional grounds
after many years have passed, after the claimant has already
suffered a deprivation, and after he has obtained representation
or his mental condition has improved.
III. MENTALLY ILL PRISONERS AND THE RIGHT TO ASSIGNED
REPRESENTATION
In the previous section, we investigated the violation of due
process that occurs when a mentally ill person is deprived of
statutory benefits without representation. In this section, we
investigate the solution. Specifically, the issue is whether
assigned representation is a viable remedy for a due process
violation.
Prisoners, probationers, and parolees are not generally
entitled to either retained or appointed representation during
administrative disciplinary hearings for violation of prison
regulations, 41 subject to some exceptions. For example, in
Gagnon v. Scarpelli,42 the United States Supreme Court ruled:
Presumptively, it may be said that counsel should be provided
in cases where, after being informed of his right to request
to pursue appropriate administrative remedies); Cottrell v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 342
(6th Cir. 1992) (rejecting plaintiff's claim because the procedure by which his claim
for benefits was denied was not constitutionally defective); Lewellen v. Sullivan, 949
F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1991) (recognizing the existence of the doctrine, but holding it
inapplicable under the facts of the case); Young v. Bowen, 858 F.2d 951 (4th Cir.
1988) (holding that the appellant's mental condition rendered her incapable of
pursuing her claims for benefits through a full administrative appeal, and that
refusal to re-open those claims based upon procedural res judicata was a violation of
due process); Elchediak v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 892 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that
claimant presented a colorable constitutional claim since he was precluded from
litigating the denial of disability benefits because mental illness prevented him from
proceeding administratively, in a timely fashion); Penner v. Schweiker, 701 F.2d
256 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that a failure to provide the claimant with adequate
notice of his right to request a hearing regarding the denial of disability insurance
benefits constituted a due process violation).
41 See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192 (1984) (holding that
respondents were not constitutionally entitled to appointed counsel); Baxter v.
Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 315 (1976) (refusing to entitle inmates to retained or
appointed counsel in disciplinary hearings).
42 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
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counsel, the probationer or parolee makes such a request, based
on a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not committed
the alleged violation of the conditions upon which he is at
liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of public
record or is uncontested, there are substantial reasons which
justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation
inappropriate, and that the reasons are complex or otherwise
difficult to develop or present. In passing on a request for the
appointment of counsel, the responsible agency also should
consider, especially in doubtful cases, whether the probationer
appears to be capable of speaking effectively for himself 43
The Court has long shown special consideration for the right
to legal assistance for prisoners with disabilities. In Johnson v.
Avery, 44 the Court invalidated Tennessee prison regulations
prohibiting a prisoner from helping another prepare a writ of
habeas corpus.45 The Court, reasoning that such a rule would
prevent many from filing the writ, held:
There can be no doubt that Tennessee could not constitutionally
adopt and enforce a rule forbidding illiterate or poorly educated
prisoners to file habeas corpus petitions. Here Tennessee has
adopted a rule which, in the absence of any other source of
assistance for such prisoners, effectively does just that ....
Jails and penitentiaries include among their inmates a high
percentage of persons who are totally or functionally illiterate,
whose educational attainments are slight, and whose
intelligence is limited.46
In Wolff v. McDonnell,47 the Court held that assigned
counsel was not constitutionally required for all incarcerated
prisoners (as opposed to probationers and parolees) facing
disciplinary proceedings that could result in loss of good time
credit.48 The Court held that the appointment of counsel for
disciplinary proceedings would cast an adversarial shadow upon
the proceedings, 49 effectively negating the very purpose of the
proceeding. The court went on to discuss the significant burden
43 Id. at 790-91 (emphasis added).
393 U.S. 483 (1969).
45 See id. at 487.
46 Id.
47 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
48 See id. at 570.
49 See id.
326
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of providing counsel to all qualified inmates.50 Because of the
large number of hearings conducted, the court would encounter
practical problems in finding enough attorneys to represent
qualified individuals at the proceedings. 51
But regarding those under a disability, the court stated:
Where an illiterate inmate is involved, or where the complexity
of the issue makes it unlikely that the inmate will be able to
collect and present the evidence necessary for an adequate
comprehension of the case, he should be free to seek the aid of a
fellow inmate, or if that is forbidden, to have adequate
substitute aid in the form of help from the staff or from a
sufficiently competent inmate designated by the staff.52
Coming closer to grips with the issue at hand, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that when a mentally ill prisoner
decompensates under the stresses of imprisonment and the
prison contemplates taking steps to provide appropriate
psychiatric assistance to control the situation against the
prisoner's will, the prisoner is entitled to representation at the
subsequent administrative hearing.53
In Vitek v. Jones,54 the prisoner faced transfer to a mental
hospital after an administrative hearing.55  Finding a
deprivation of liberty in the transfer that exceeded the prisoner's
imposed sentence because conditions of his confinement would be
changed, 56 the Court "recognized that prisoners who are
illiterate and uneducated have a greater need for assistance in
exercising their rights."57 The court also recognized that "[a]
prisoner thought to be suffering from a mental disease or defect
requiring involuntary treatment probably has an even greater
50 See id. (anticipating delays and the inability to supply enough attorneys).
51 See id.
52 Id.
53 See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134 (1992) (stating that "involuntary
administration of anti-psychotic drugs [is] protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause"); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 236
(1990) (holding that prisoner subject to "forced administration of anti-psychotic
drugs" is entitled to an "independent lay advisor"); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480,
496-97 (1980) (declaring that a prisoner "suffering from a mental disease or defect"
requires counsel once prisoner is subject to "involuntary treatment").
54 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
55 See id. at 484.
N See id. at 488.
57 Id. at 496.
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need for legal assistance, for such a prisoner is more likely to be
unable to understand or exercise his rights." 8 Under those very
limited circumstances, the court held that it would be
appropriate to provide indigent prisoners with counsel.59
Likewise, in Washington v. Harper,60  the State of
Washington sought to involuntarily administer psychotropic
medication to a psychotic prisoner with a history of violent
assaults who was confined to a hospital administered by the
prison system. The prison's administrative policy called for an
administrative hearing prior to the administration of any
medication.6' The prisoner was entitled to prior notice of the
hearing, notice of his tentative diagnosis, the factual basis for
the diagnosis, and the factual basis for the prison believing that
involuntary medication was necessary.62 While rejecting the
prisoner's contention that Due Process required provision of an
attorney at the hearing,63 the Court held: "Given the nature of
the [essentially medical] decision to be made, we conclude that
the provision of an independent lay adviser who understands the
psychiatric issues involved is sufficient protection."64
Using the Social Security termination cases in Section II
and the cases regarding mentally ill prisoners in Section III, the
general rule is that the deprivation of public benefits owed to a
mentally ill prisoner without legal assistance in the
administrative process is constitutionally defective.
Furthermore, Due Process requires the appointment of
competent legal assistance once the prisoner's disability is
recognized by the administrative agency. If mentally ill
prisoners are entitled to legal representation in administrative
proceedings, there can be no basis in logic or in law to deprive
other mentally ill individuals, who are not in prison, of this
favored treatment. It is incongruous that prisoners receive
better treatment than the free population, and this disparity
should cease.
58 Id. at 496-97.
59 See id.
60 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
61 See id. at 215.
62 See id. at 216.
63 See id. at 236.
64 Id.
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The general proposition is that the right to counsel does not
attach as a concomitant of due process when property rather
than liberty interests are at stake.65 If exception to the general
rule that prisoners, probationers, and parolees are not entitled to
assigned counsel lies in the presence of mental disability, an
analogous exception can be made for those facing civil
administrative proceedings. The line of prisoners cases
previously discussed present anomalies because the need for
prison discipline negates the right to assigned representation
generally associated with loss of liberty. The prisoners' mental
illness as an exception to the exception effectively restores the
right. By analogy, an individual with a mental illness engaged
in administrative proceedings regarding public benefits, is an
exception to the rule that no right to assigned representation
exists when property interests are at issue.
In conclusion, there is no due process right to assigned
representation in civil administrative proceedings except in the
presence of mental illness. There are two distinctions between
Vitek and Harper on the one hand, and the case of a mentally ill
person denied or terminated from public benefits on the other.
First, Vitek and Harper were prisoners, not free persons.
Second, they were deprived of liberty, not property. Since
prisoners are not entitled to assigned representation regarding
65 The pre-eminent generalization that emerges from the Court's precedents on
an indigent's right to appointed counsel is that such a right has been recognized to
exist only where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation.
See Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981). Lassiter asked
whether due process required appointed counsel for indigents in cases involving
judicial termination of their parental rights. Although the Court did not require the
appointment under the specific facts of the case, it left the door open for future
cases, stating-
If, in a given case, the parent's interests were at their strongest, the State's
interests were at their weakest, and the risks of error were at their peak, it
could not be said that the Eldridge factors did not overcome the
presumption against the right to appointed counsel, and that due process
did not therefore require the appointment of counsel.... We therefore
adopt the standard found appropriate in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, and leave the
decision whether due process calls for the appointment of counsel for
indigent parents in termination proceedings to be answered in the first
instance by the trial court, subject, of course, to appellate review.
Id. at 31-32. The Lassiter decision was recently acknowledged in M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,
519 U.S. 102 (1996) "While the [Lassiter] Court declined to recognize an automatic
right to appointed counsel, it said that an appointment would be due when
warranted by the character and difficulty of the case." Id. at 117.
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deprivation of liberty unless special circumstances exist such as
illiteracy, unusually complex issues, or mental illness, the free
population should likewise be entitled to representation under
similar circumstances.
IV. NOT COUNSEL, BUT GUARDIAN AD LITEM
The cases cited in Section III concern the right to counsel,
not to a guardian ad litem. While there are important
similarities between the two offices (e.g., both are personal
representatives) there are distinctions that are just as
significant.
To fully appreciate the function of a guardian ad litem, we
must first consider the usual division of labor between attorney
and client. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Any mental or physical condition of a client that renders him
incapable of making a considered judgment on his own behalf
casts additional responsibilities upon his lawyer. Where an
incompetent is acting through a guardian or other legal
representative, a lawyer must look to such representative for
those decisions which are normally the prerogative of the client
to make. If a client under disability has no legal
representative, his lawyer may be compelled in court
proceedings to make decisions on behalf of the client.66
Thus, the conventional wisdom is that the client determines
the direction and goal of the litigation "'within the bounds of the
law,' "67 while the attorney determines how to achieve them. The
scheme breaks down if the client is unable to provide the
litigation its needed direction, determine the goals of the
litigation, or understand the bounds of the law. Consequently, if
there is no general guardian to look to, the situation calls for the
appointment of a guardian ad litem.
Black's Law Dictionary defines guardian ad litem as "a
special guardian appointed by the court in which a particular
litigation is pending to represent an infant, ward or unborn
person in that particular litigation, and the status of guardian
66 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-12 (1983).
67 Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (discussing the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility DR 7-102 entitled "Representing a Client Within the
Bounds of the Law") (citation omitted); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (1983) (promulgating guidelines for representing a client
in conformance with the law).
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ad litem exists only in that specific litigation in which the
appointment occurs."6 A guardian ad litem's primary objective
is to protect the best interests of the party represented.69
Other jurisdictions following this rule include Alaska,70
Massachusetts, 71 Mississippi, 72 Nebraska, 73 and West Virginia.74
Among the federal courts, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
concurs with this rule.7 5
68 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 706 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted).
69 See generally McKay v. Owens, 937 P.2d 1222, 1231-32 (Idaho 1997) (stating
that a guardian ad litem functions as an agent or arm of the court and is entitled to
quasi-judicial immunity); In re Lisa G., 504 A.2d 1, 3-4 (N.H. 1986) (stating that a
court has the authority to appoint a guardian ad litem in "children in need of
services" cases, and that defense counsel should request appointment of such if
counsel believes that the child is unable to act in his or her best interest); David S.
v. Laura S., 507 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Wis. 1993) (holding that a guardian ad litem acts as
an advocate for the best interests of a child, and implements whatever a prudent
attorney would recommend to a competent adult client); Wiederholt v. Fischer, 485
N.W.2d 442, 446 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a guardian ad litem's duty is to
represent the concept of the best interest of the child, and not necessarily the child
per se).
70 See Carter v. Brodrick, 816 P.2d 202, 205 (Alaska 1991) ("The court shall
require a guardian ad litem when, in the opinion of the court, representation of the
minor's best interests, to be distinguished from preferences, would serve the welfare
of the minor.") (citation omitted).
71 See Guardianship of a Mentally Ill Person, 489 N.E.2d 1005, 1008 (Mass.
1986) ("Generally speaking in all cases where a court appoints a guardian ad litem
he acts for the ward and determines what should be done for the best interest and
welfare of the ward.") (citation omitted).
72 See Copiah County Dep't of Human Servs. v. Linda D., 658 So. 2d 1378, 1382
(Miss. 1995) ("[Tihe guardian ad litem is the one primarily charged with and looked
to for protection of the children's interest when judicial proceedings arise.").
73 See State v. C.M., 431 N.W.2d 611 (Neb. 1988). The court stated:
Generally speaking, a guardian ad litem appears to be an individual who
steps into the position of the minor and, after considering the alternatives,
asserts the right of the minor as the guardian ad litem sees fit .... A
guardian ad litem is to determine the best interests of the minor without
necessary reference to the wishes of the minor.
Id. at 612-13 (quoting Orr. v. Knowles, 337 N.W.2d 699, 701-03 (Neb. 1983)).
74 See In re Jeffrey R.L, 435 S.E.2d 162, 175 (W. Va. 1993) ("The G[uardian]
A[d] L[item] does not necessarily represent a child's desires but should formulate an
independent position regarding relevant issues.").
75 See Planned Parenthood Ass'n. v. Miller, 934 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1991). The
court stated:
A guardian ad litem is appointed "to protect the interests of the minor" in a
particular matter before the court. In most litigation that is conducted by a
guardian ad litem on a minor's behalf, the guardian ad litem, as a part of
his duties, must determine whether it is in the minor's best interest to
continue, settle, or dismiss the litigation.... In a minor's action against a
tortfeasor, for example, the guardian ad litem may determine that it is in
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Other jurisdictions stress a more active role for the court,
and subordinate the role of the guardian ad litem to an officer of
the court who answers to the court rather than to the ward.
Sometimes, the same court will stress first the role of the
guardian ad litem, and secondarily that of the the court.76 Other
courts stress the duty of the guardian ad litem to the court
rather than the ward.77
the best interests of the minor to settle; he then is able to compromise the
claim, provided he obtains the court's permission.
Id. at 1480 (citation omitted).
76 See id. at 1480-81 (discussing the determination powers of the guardian ad
litem and how these determinations are subject to judicial approval) (citing Saliba v.
Saliba, 42 S.E.2d 748, 752 (Ga. 1947).
77 See Kahre v. Kahre, 916 P.2d 1355 (Okla. 1995). The court held:
In custody matters the guardian ad litem has almost universally been seen
as owing his primary duty to the court that appointed him, not strictly to
the child client.... [T]he guardian ad litem fills a void for the court.
Without the guardian ad litem, the trial court has no practical means to
ensure that it receives the information it needs to secure the best interests
of the child are served until after the information has been filtered through
the adversarial attitudes of the warring parents. The guardian ad litem
makes his own investigation as the trial court's agent. The wishes of the
minor child are one factor to be considered, but the guardian ad litem's
obligation remains the same as that of the trial court: the child's best
interests, although the child's wishes may be otherwise.
Id. at 1362 (citations omitted).
It should be noted that the child in Kahre, although vitally interested in the
outcome, was not a party to the dispute between the parents. Thus, the role of the
court and of the guardian ad litem were identical--to determine the best interests of
the child in a custody dispute. It is doubtful that the practical result, regardless of
the language used, would be the same if the ward was an adverse party and the
judge's role was not to protect his interests, but to decree them. Additionally, note
Kollsman, A Div. Of Sequa Corp. v. Cohen, 996 F.2d 702, 706 (4th Cir. 1993) ("It is
well recognized that the guardian ad litem serves essentially as an officer of the
court. He is there not only to manage the litigation for the incompetent but also to
assist the court in performing its duty to jealously protect the incompetent's
interests.") (citations omitted). A more extreme form of this view was stated in
Dacanay v. Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1978), where the court stated:
It is an ancient precept of Anglo-American jurisprudence that infant and
other incompetent parties are wards of any court called upon to measure
and weigh their interests. The guardian ad litem is but an officer of the
court .... [Elvery step in the proceeding occurs under the aegis of the
court .... The duties of a guardian ad litem are essentially ministerial.
While he may negotiate a proposed compromise to be referred to the court,
he cannot render such a compromise effective merely by giving his consent.
Id. at 1079 (citations omitted).
Yet a few years later the same circuit held: "As this case illustrates, the
appointment of a guardian ad litem is more than a mere formalism. A guardian ad
litem is authorized to act on behalf of his [not the court's] ward and may make all
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In almost all cases involving termination from public
benefits, the best interest of the disabled individual is clear
regardless of whether he or she is considered the ward of the
guardian or of the administrative agency considering the claim.
The guardian ad litem has sweeping powers. Those powers
include representing the interests of the ward and determining
what interests require protection.
V. IMPACT ON THE DISABLED
We now turn to the tripartite analysis of Mathews v.
Eldridge.78 The "private interest that will be affected by the
official action."79 will vary depending on the program and the
extent of the benefits denied. Some programs are lifelines that
are crucial to the recipients' well being. For example, disability
benefits, public assistance and veterans' benefits provide cash for
vital needs, and have an ancillary component of providing for
medical care.80 Food stamps provide for most individuals'
nutritional needs. Public housing and section 8 subsidies
provide for shelter. Other programs, usually local in scope,
appropriate decisions in the course of specific litigation." United States v. 30.64
Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 1986). This practitioner's experience has
been that most judges, overwhelmed by their caseloads, are more than happy to
allow experienced counsel, personally known and appointed by them, to conduct the
litigation. Although all jurisdictions require the court to place its seal on any final
settlement regarding an incompetent ward for whom a guardian ad litem has been
appointed, most judges will give the terms of such final settlement only cursory
inspection; a minority will take a more active role.
78 424 U.S. 319. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (discussing the
Supreme Court's tripartite test to determine the necessary procedures by which an
administrative agency could effect the termination of benefits).
79 Id. at 335.
80 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 370 (1971) (describing the
necessities of life to include food, clothing, and shelter); Loper v. New York City
Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029, 1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (discussing food, shelter,
clothing, medical care, and transportation as examples of the necessities of life)
(citations omitted), affd, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Jeffrey L. Dunoff,
Does Globalization Advance Human Rights?, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 125, 135 (1999)
(referring to former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's definition of human rights to
include "shelter, food, health care and education"); Elena W. Slipp, Loper v. New
York City Police Department Begs the Question: Is Panhandling Protected by the
First Amendment?, 60 BROOK L. REV. 587, 613 (1994) (discussing the court's
recognition that the goals of both charity and begging are to provide people with the
necessities of life).
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touch on less vital areas. The denial or loss of most nationally
distributed benefits can devastate the mentally ill.
A study of homeless individuals staying at shelters in
Boston and Cambridge, Massachusetts, found that 91% of those
interviewed suffered from some form of diagnosable mental
illness, including 46% with major mental illnesses such as
schizophrenia and other major affective disorders. Another 29%
were diagnosed as alcoholics; another 21% had severe
personality disorders. Of the 9% who were free of mental illness,
many were children of shelter guests, or had only recently
arrived in Boston and were expecting to begin work shortly.81
The study revealed that only 3% of the sample was receiving
disability benefits. Another 12% received general relief, and 3%
received Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).
Another 4% received Social Security retirement benefits, while
only 6% of those interviewed were employed. Of gravest concern
is that only 1% of the homeless individuals received Medicare,
and only 20% received Medicaid. Seventy-two percent had no
medical insurance at all. 82
This study is consistent with the findings from other studies.
One study conducted in Philadelphia found that 84% of shelter
residents were mentally ill.83 Others studies of homeless adults,
conducted in Los Angeles, reported that 75% of male subjects
and 90% of female subjects were psychiatrically disabled,8 4 while
only 25% received public assistance of any kind.85 It is clear that
treatment levels are low.86
The percentage figures regarding mentally ill homeless
individuals are spread across a large base. The 1990 census
counted 228,621 homeless individuals in shelters and street
81 See Ellen L. Bassuk et al., Is Homelessness a Mental Health Problem?, 141:12
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1546, 1547 (1984).
82 See id. at 1548 (detailing the breakdown of the 22% of the total shelter guests
who were receiving financial assistance).
83 See A. Anthony Arce, et al., A Psychiatric Profile of Street People Admitted to
an Emergency Shelter, 34 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 812, 814 (1983).
84 See FARR, LA. DEPT OF MENTAL HEALTH, SKID Row PROJECT (1982).
85 See Marjorie J. Robertson & Michael R. Cousineau, Health Status and Access
to Health Services among the Urban Homeless, 76 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 561, 562
tbl.1 (1986).
88 See Bassuk, supra note 81, at 1548. Four percent of the homeless individuals
had private insurance, and the remaining 1% received benefits from the Veterans
Administration. See id.
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locations.87 According to most reports, this is an undercount,
given that many shelters are unlicensed, and because many
homeless people prefer to stay at street locations that are not
visible. Police also encourage the relocation of homeless
individuals from visible to less visible locations. A 1987 Urban
Institute study estimated the number of homeless individuals to
be somewhere between 500,000 and 600,000. 8
VI. PROBABILITY OF WRONGFUL DENIAL
It is anticipated that whenever a practitioner acts according
to the note's thesis, he will receive a report by a qualified
professional stating that the subject of the report suffers from
severe mental disability.
The impact of wrongful denial of benefits to mentally ill
persons is significant. Given a serious mental illness, the
probability that the denial will be unjustifiable is also high.
Largely fact-specific to a given case, the probability of wrongful
denial of benefits is directly proportional to the level of disability
suffered by the claimant.
The studies cited in Section V bespeak the difficulties that
mentally ill persons face in obtaining entitlements. As one
commentator stated:
Though they may be entitled to income assistance of some kind
(SSI, Welfare, VA), the procedures for obtaining it are beyond
the reach of the majority of the homeless .... Gathering the
necessary documents can be time consuming, the process
arduous and confusing, and the outcome often negative ....
Experienced caseworkers who accompany homeless persons
through the bureaucratic mazes and help them manage the
money when it arrives, are in short supply.8 9
87 See ALICE S. BAUM & DONALD W. BURNES, A NATION IN DENIAL: THE TRUTH
ABOUT HOMELEssNEss 123 (1993) (discussing the inaccuracies of counting the
homeless).
88 See id. at 120-22.
89 Ellen Baxter & Kim Hopper, The New Mendicancy: Homeless in New York
City, 52 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 393, 403-04 (1982); cf Michael Diehl, Screening
Out Worthy Social Security Disability Claimants and Its Effect on Homelessness, 45
U. MIAMI L. REV. 617 (1990-91) (stating that despite the millions of dollars
distributed as federal disability payments, there remain large numbers of disabled
homeless individuals who do not receive vital federal aid).
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In one study,90 researchers randomly divided SSI-eligible,
mentally ill clients of community mental health centers into two
groups. Members of the first group received assistance from
individuals experienced in delivering mental health services and
trained in the substantive and procedural aspects of applying for
SSI. Members of the second group received assistance from case
managers at the community health centers. 9l Members of the
latter group were only one-half as likely as members of the
former group to receive SSI benefits. 92 Members of the first
group had their applications for SSI submitted more quickly, and
in turn, received their benefits more quickly.93
Termination of disability benefits is a related problem.
Although mentally ill persons only constituted 11% of those
receiving disability benefits in the early 1980s, one third of
individuals terminated from disability benefits were mentally
ill.94 Many mentally ill individuals who were terminated from
disability benefits were rendered homeless.95 At one point, 40%
of those housed in the New York City shelter system had been
denied or terminated from disability benefits. 96 One study of
mentally ill SSI recipients found that the more severely ill an
SSI recipient, the more likely the recipient was to be dropped
from the roles.97
90 Michael G. Dow & Timothy L. Boaz, Assisting Clients of Community Mental
Health Centers to Secure SSI Benefits: A Controlled Evaluation, 30 COMMUNITY
MENTAL HEALTH J. 429 (1994).
91 See id.
92 See id. at 434.
93 See id. at 436.
94 See JOEL BLAU, THE VISIBLE POOR: HOMELESSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES
57 (1992) (noting the disadvantages that the mentally disabled suffer when
attempting to secure an appeal against a termination of benefits).
95 See Ellen L. Bassuk, The Homelessness Problem, 251 Sci. AM. 40, 41 (July
1984) (inferring that the loss of benefits has lead to homelessness); Robert J.
Rubinson, Government Benefits: Social Security Disability, 1987 ANN. SURV. AM. L.
195, 198 (1988) (noting that the loss of housing is one of the hardships that result
from the loss of disability benefits).
96 See City of New York v. Heckler, 578 F. Supp. 1109, 1119 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
(citing the estimate of an SSI outreach program coordinator), affd, 742 F.2d 729
(2d. Cir. 1984), affd sub nom. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467 (1986).
97 See Steven P. Segal & Namkee g. Choi, Factors Affecting SSI Support for
Sheltered Care Residents With Serious Mental Illness, 42 HOSP. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 1132, 1137 (1991) ("Severe symptomatology and a longer period of time
spent in psychiatric hospitals predict[] a shorter period of time on SSI.").
PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY DISABLED
The problem is likely to be exacerbated by welfare reform.
The New York City Department of Social Services planned to
place disabled mothers of small children into workfare slots.98
These women had been classified as unemployable by city
doctors.99 The social services agencies responsible for providing
the workfare slots accepted only 36% of those referred. 1 ° The
New York City Human Resources Administration, under federal
investigation for its disobedience of the law requiring city
workers to allow needy persons to apply for public assistance
without delay, first stated that it would discontinue the local
policy of requiring applicants to make two trips to the office,
whereby applicants were permitted to register their names and
addresses on the first visit, but were forced to return to actually
file the application.1° 1 Unfortunately, in an abrupt reversal, the
agency re-implemented its two-day filing process. 0 2  After
concerned advocacy groups filed a federal suit, the agency
admitted it improperly denied access to food stamps and
Medicaid, 10 3 and promised to reform the application process.1°4
The agency did not consider the disproportionate impact
such a policy would have on disoriented individuals who most
likely cannot remember to organize two trips to accomplish what
could have been done in one. Whether intentional or not, the
policy further disadvantages mentally disabled persons by
burdening their ability to fully participate in programs designed
to help them.
A recent study based on a survey of providers of services for
the homeless'0 5 reported a huge increase in the numbers of
mentally ill persons assisted. Between January 1995 and April
9 See id.
99 See Rachel L. Swarns, Giuliani to Place Disabled Mothers in Workfare Jobs,
N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1998, at Al.
100 See Rachel L. Swarns, Of Ill Mothers, 36% Are Held Able to Work, N.Y.
TIMES, June 9, 1998, at B5.
101 See Abby Goodnough, City to Speed Applications for Welfare, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 1998, at B1.
102 See Rachel L. Swarns, City Ends Plan to Speed Up Welfare Aid, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 1998, at B1.
103 See Rachel L. Swarns, New York City Admits Turning Away Poor, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 1999, at B3.
104 See Rachel L. Swarns, After Ruling, New York Vows to Amend Application
Process for Needy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1999, at B4.
1O6 COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, LEGACY OF NEGLECT: THE IMPACT OF
WELFARE REFORM ON NEW YORICS HOMELESS (1999).
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1999, the period covered by the study and coinciding with New
York State's implementation of its version of welfare reform,
84% of the emergency shelter providers surveyed reported
increases in the numbers of mentally ill persons seeking
services. I°6 Similar increases were reported by 66% of providers
of all types of homeless services. 10 7 Of the emergency shelter
providers surveyed, 57% reported an increase in the numbers of
developmentally disabled persons seeking shelter.108 Of the food
pantries surveyed, 68% reported increases in the numbers of
mentally disabled persons assisted.1°9  The study faulted
unnecessarily onerous procedures for obtaining work exemptions
for a significant part of the lack of access to social services.
Ignoring evidence provided by treating physicians, disabled
people were denied work exemptions on the basis of cursory
examinations performed by agency physicians. Upon denial of
the work exemption, the disabled person would have 10 days to
produce medical evidence challenging a work assignment.110 The
difficulty in obtaining both appointments and medical records
from public hospitals is simply not considered by the local
district.
Administrative hearings regarding the benefits of mentally
disabled persons are apt to be inherently complex. Statutory
provisions' mandate that government programs provide
"reasonable accommodation" to the needs of mentally ill clients.
The issue of determining the extent of those accommodations
adds another layer of complexity to a hearing that a disabled
person may not be able to handle in the first place.
VII. BURDEN ON AGENCY
Many Americans suffer from diagnosable mental illness. 112
Many, unable to support themselves, are dependent upon public
106 See id. at 5, 41, 51.
107 See id. at 49.
108 See id. at. 6, 41, 51, 55.
109 See id. at 52.
110 See id. at 63.
111 See infra Section VIII (discussing how the courts have interpreted the
statutory requirement of reasonable accommodation with respect to disabled
individuals' access to housing).
112 See, e.g., Southern California Psychiatric Society Observes Mental Illness
Awareness Week, October 3-9 1999, PR NEWSWIRE, Sept. 20, 1999, available in
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benefits. 113 A large number, but not all, would require the type
of legal assistance contemplated here.
First, severe mental illness constitutes only a fraction of the
population. Those who are cared for by their families and those
connected to a social service agency (which could serve as
advocate), and those still able to fend for themselves despite
illness, would not turn to an agency for assistance. Thus, the
burden on the agency to provide guardians would not be
overwhelmingly weighty.
Second, the agency needs to be efficient in recognizing and
responding to requests for aid. Clearly, there are sufficient
resources to account for speedy identification and appointment of
an appropriate guardian ad litem.
Third, identifying the needs of the mentally disabled must
be addressed. Asking an individual about his specific needs is
the easiest way to identify someone in need of assistance.
Beyond that, application forms should routinely contain
questions regarding physicians consulted and medications taken.
The signs of severe mental illness are not difficult to spot.
For example, a confused thought process, where both the process
and content of thought are disordered, might be an indication of
schizophrenia.114 Alternating between "depression and normal
mood and between extreme elation and normal mood indicates
possible bi-polar disorder."115 Any reasonably intelligent person
can be taught to ask someone to draw a clock face, or to perform
serial sevens. 116 While these simple observations and tests
LExIS, News Library, News Group File, All (noting a National Institute of Mental
Health estimate that 28.1% of the population over age 18 will be the victim of "a
mental disorder or substance abuse disorder in any one year").
The fact that the popular press has reported on the existence of a "Mental
Health Awareness Week," highlights the scope of mental illness in our society.
113 See, e.g., Welfare Reform Winners, WASH. TIMS, Aug. 23, 1999, available in
LEXIS, News Library, News Group File, All (noting an Urban Institute Statistic
that 7.3 million Americans are on welfare).
114 See ATKINSON ET AL., supra note 1, at 648-51. Other indicators of
schizophrenia are disturbances of perception, irrational emotional responses,
withdrawal from reality, unusual motor activity, and a general decreased ability to
perform day to day tasks. See id.
115 Id.
116 Counting backward by sevens from one hundred is a common test of
cognitive ability. See Kenneth Rockwood et al., Comprehensive Geriatric Assessment,
103 POST GRADUATE MED. 247 (1998), available in LEXIS (indicating the test's
importance to determine cognitive function); NPR All Things Considered (NPR
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would be conducted by lay people and would not produce a
definitive diagnosis, they would serve as preliminary screening
devices to identify those in need of further consideration. The
subsequent screening could be performed by individuals with
training in clinical social work or psychiatric nursing experience.
The purpose of testing is to determine functional disability, not
differential diagnosis. For example, severe cognitive deficits
alone qualify an individual for the relief advocated here.
Therefore, the ultimate determination of the underlying deficit
characterized as schizophrenia or dementia is irrelevant. 117
Fourth, there needs to be a mechanism for providing
assistance. Once identified as an individual in need, he or she
should be provided with representation immediately following
the initial application stage. The representative, as a guardian
ad litem, may be in-house agency personnel 18 or an outside legal
or social services agency. Guardians ad litem need not be
lawyers or even supervised by lawyers. At a minimum, they
need to understand agency rules and regulations, and the
difficulties of working with disabled individuals. Guardians
need resources such as time, money, access to agency files, and
the power to obtain supporting documents, such as medical,
financial, and birth records when mentally ill people are
incapable of providing such information themselves. If an
administrative law judge is presiding over the matter at a quasi-
judicial hearing, time constraints may necessitate subpoena
power.119 Following the common law applicable to the powers
accorded guardians ad litem in a judicial setting, the guardians
radio broadcast, Aug. 18, 1998) (reporting on application of the test).
117 It would make a difference to one offering treatment. Schizophrenia may be
treatable with psychotropics: dementia is not. See Joshua Rolnick, A Neuroscientist
Says No to Drugs, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 4, 1998, at A10 (discussing the
controversy surrounding psychotropics); Interview with Harold Pincus, Psychiatrist,
on Morning Edition (NPR radio broadcast, Feb. 18, 1998) (concluding use of
psychotropic drugs is increasing).
118 See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 217 (1990). Harper was
represented at his administrative hearing by a nurse from another prison run by
the same Department of Corrections which sought to involuntarily administer
psychotropic medication. See id.
119 Social Security AI's, among other administrative officers, may issue
subpoenas, but have no contempt power. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(d) (1994) (giving Social
Security Administrative Law Judges subpoena power). The power is enforceable
only in district court, and only by the Commissioner of Social Security. See 42
U.S.C. § 405(e) (1994).
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ad litem may have to substitute their judgment for that of the
mentally ill person on matters related to their responsibilities.
Under the pressure of litigation over many of the issues
raised here, °20 the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA)
recently issued remedial regulations.' 2' For the most part, the
regulations provide adequate solutions. In brief, they provide for
identification of a potentially mentally ill person facing quasi-
judicial administrative terminations by the Housing Authority
staff at the project where the person lives. 2 2 They are to refer
the matter to NYCHA's in-house social services department,
which may in turn refer the matter to an outside "professional
consultant."123  Following the issued report, the project
management is to take "reasonable corrective action."12 Only
then can the matter be referred to a quasi-judicial hearing officer
for further proceedings upon the appointment of a Law
Guardian.1'5
The regulations do not deal with the applications process, or
with any adverse action taken without a quasi-judicial
hearing.1' Yet, at least one administrative agency has already
taken the lead to promulgate regulations providing mentally ill
120 See Blatch v. Franco, 97 NO. CIV. 97-3918, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7717
(S.D.N.Y. May 26, 1998) (discussing the rights of individuals with mental
disabilities to secure guardians ad litem in tenancy termination hearings and
eviction proceedings commenced by the NYCHA).
121 N.Y. City Housing Auth., GM-3630 (Apr. 29, 1999) (reprinted in the
Appendix).
122 It is of particular interest that someone may be identified as potentially in
need of assistance "from the personal knowledge of any Authority staff familiar with
the tenant...." Id. (emphasis added).
123 Presumably, a psychologist holding a Ph. D. or a psychiatrist holding an
M.D. "The Professional Consultant... must [evaluate the situation] and submit a
report to the Borough Social Services Administrator." Id.
124 "Reasonable corrective action may include arranging for financial
management, cleaning and/or housekeeping services, communication with family
members or community based social workers, identification and request for the
intervention of community based case management services." Id.
125 "If the Social Services report recommends the appointment of a guardian,
OSTA shall then forward the case to the Law Department for the purpose of
obtaining a guardian." Id.
126 For example, NYCHA tenants must annually re-certify their subsidized rent
by submitting documents relating to their income and that of their household
members. Failure to do so leads to the loss of the subsidy and to the NYCHA
charging an unsubsidized rent. The regulations do not cover such eventualities.
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people with a voice and an advocate in some administrative
proceedings.
VIII. RELATED STATUTORY CONSIDERATIONS
Federal statutes and regulations promulgated thereunder
prohibit the denial of full participation in any benefit program
administered by state or local government by reason of
disability. These regulations do not govern benefit programs
administered by the federal government.127 Mental impairments
are included in the statutory definition of disability. 128 Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973129 extends like provisions to
disabled people receiving benefits under federally-funded
programs, regardless of whether the government administers the
program or not. The Fair Housing Amendments Act mandates
that most landlords-including public housing authorities-
make "reasonable accommodation" to the needs of disabled
tenants. 130
Given such seemingly thorough statutory coverage, coupled
with the rule that a court will interpret the Constitution only
when all attempts to reach a decision by other means fail, 131 this
article's focus on Due Process may seem misplaced. Federally
administered programs such as those administered by the Social
Security and Veterans' Administrations, however, are not
covered by statute. Thus, the argument here fills a gap in
statutory coverage. Given the rule that statutes be construed
consistently with the Constitution,132 this note's argument
informs any discussion of statutory rights and responsibilities.
127 See Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994). For an
extended definition of "full participation," see 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1).
128 See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 ("Disability means with respect to an individual, a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities of such individual; a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as
having such an impairment.").
129 20 U.S.C. § 1472 (1994).
130 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1994).
"SI See, e.g., Holmes v. New York City Housing Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir.
1968) (addressing fair selection process for applicants to public housing); Hornsby v.
Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964) (discussing fair selection process for applicants
for state liquor license).
132 See Califano v. Yamasaki, 142 U.S. 682 (1979) ("[If a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which a serious doubt of constitutionality may be
avoided, a court should adopt that construction."); see also Arizonians for Official
English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055 at 1074 (1997).
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"Reasonable accommodations" due mentally ill persons go
beyond the mere decision-making process used to determine
eligibility for the standard benefits. Such benefits include
special, although reasonable, accommodations that are necessary
to ensure the equal right to enjoy those benefits. Determining
the boundaries of the "reasonable accommodations" doctrine is
not an easy task, and requires fine judgment. Such cases are
inherently difficult, and representation of mentally ill people is
especially needed in this area.
The statutes, identical in their anti-discriminatory effect,13
are supposed to be broadly construed.134 Often, however, they
are not so interpreted. For example, in determining whether a
requested accommodation is "reasonable," some courts, rather
than using the balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, have
instead considered only whether the accommodation would
"substantially" modify or fundamentally alter a program.135 As
one court articulated, in widely paraphrased form, "[rleasonable
accommodation does not impose an undue financial or
administrative burden, or fundamentally undermine a statutory
or regulatory scheme."136 This standard is apparently without
regard to the impact to the disabled individual.13 7 Other courts
133 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, 51 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 1995).
We believe that in enacting the anti-discrimination provisions of the
FHAA, Congress relied on the standard of reasonable accommodation
developed under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, codified at
29 U.S.C. §794.... The legislative history of section 42 U.S.C. §3604(f)
plainly indicates that its drafters intended to draw on case law developed
under section 504, a provision also specifically directed at eradication
discrimination against handicapped individuals.
Id. at 334; see also, e.g., Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, 124 F.3d 597,
603 (4th Cir. 1997); Hovsons, Inc. v. Township of Brick, 89 F.3d 1096, 1101 (3d Cir.
1996); U.S. v. California Mobile Home Park Management Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1416-
17 (9th Cir. 1994); Smith and Lee Associates, Inc. v. City of Taylor, 13 F.3d 920, 930
(6th Cir. 1993).
134 See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1972);
Casa Marie v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico, 988 F.2d 252 (1st Cir. 1993).
135 See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 n.20 (1985); Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410 (1979).
136 Hovsons, Inc., 89 F.3d. at 1105; accord Bryant Woods Inn, Inc., 124 F.3d at
604; Elderhaven, Inc. v. City of Lubbock, 98 F.3d 175 (5th Cir. 1996); see also, e.g.,
Erdman v. City of Fort Atkinson, 84 F.3d 960, 962 (7th Cir. 1996). A constitutional
challenge faces no such obstacle. Consider a statutory scheme mandating racial
discrimination. Any constitutional challenge to it would seek precisely to undermine
such statute.
m37 Some courts have balanced the needs of the parties seeking and resisting
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have held that once a plaintiff establishes discriminatory impact,
the defendant only needs to show that the discriminatory
distinction is rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose. 138 Still, others have held:
Where plaintiff seeks a judgment which would require
defendant to take affirmative action to correct a Title VIII
violation,. plaintiff must make a greater showing of
discriminatory effect. On the other hand, if plaintiff seeks a
judgment merely enjoining defendant from further interference
with the exercise of plaintiffs Title VIII rights, a lesser showing
of discriminatory effect would suffice. 139
No similar obstacle lies in the path to Due Process.
CONCLUSIONS
Mentally ill persons and others similarly disabled who are
incapable of adequately negotiating administrative processes are
entitled to representation by guardians ad litem. This right
exists regardless of whether the individual is facing a quasi-
judicial evidentiary hearing or less formal proceedings,
regardless of whether the proceedings are in the initial phases or
on administrative appeal. The scope of the argument herein
contemplates all programs where the right of participation may
produce a significant impact on the beneficiary.
An individual is still entitled to a fair selection process for
benefits which are not statutory entitlements. 140 The necessity
of a fair selection process provides the underpinning of the
proposition that both mentally impaired applicants and
recipients of public benefits are entitled to representation.
Another factor that may determine whether a constitutional
right to assigned representation exists in administrative
proceedings is whether the benefit under consideration is need-
the accommodation. See, e.g., Smith & Lee Assocs., Inc. v. City of Taylor, 102 F.3d
781, 795 (6th Cir. 1996); U.S. v. Village of Palatine, 37 F.3d 1230, 1234 (7th Cir.
1994).
138 See Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300 (9th Cir. 1997); Oxford
House-C v. City of St. Louis, 77 F.3d 249 (8th Cir. 1996); Familystyle v. City of St.
Paul, 923 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1991).
139 Casa Marie, 988 F.2d at 269, citing Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village
of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977).
140 See White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976) (discussing fair
selection process for general assistance); see supra note 131.
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based. This is the distinction that Mathews v. Eldridge held
determinative of the right to a pre-termination evidentiary
hearing.' 4' Will a future case declare this the fulcrum upon
which is balanced a seemingly unrelated right? Is the special
impact on a mentally ill person of the denial of participation in a
non-need-based program so slight?
Once the problem of treatment for mentally ill persons in
the maw of bureaucracy is identified as constitutional, we must
address the question of an appropriate remedy. I see no
alternative to the provision of a personal guardian ad litem.
This is the historical answer, given thousands of years in
Western Civilization, and pre-dating the common law.
Retroactive reinstatement of benefits will serve only those who
later fall into sympathetic hands. The remedy should be directly
connected to the deficiency to be remedied. Given that the
deficits of the mentally ill are deficits of memory, of logic, of
judgment-personal deficits-only a person can make the
situation whole. Neither extension of deadlines, nor more
detailed and confusing notices, will assist those who are
fundamentally disoriented. With the foregoing discussion in
mind, let us revisit the hypothetical applications and recipients
posited at the beginning of this article, and see what a guardian
ad litem could do for each.
1. A guardian ad litem could negotiate the process of
obtaining a foreign birth certificate for the illiterate
applicant for Social Security.
2. A guardian ad litem could receive third party notification
of the elderly ward's failure to recertify food stamps and
recertify for her, obtaining and submitting the needed
information as her recognized representative in this
matter.
3. A harder case, but not impossible. A guardian ad litem
could appear at the administrative hearing for the elderly
Alzheimer patient whose tenancy is endangered by her
drug-abusing granddaughter, argue the absence of
intentionality in the situation, and arrange for
alternatives to eviction under the "reasonable
accommodation" clause of Section 504. Relocation to a
141 See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
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smaller apartment where, due to lack of space and privacy,
the granddaughter could not comfortably conduct her
prostitutional activities, would prove effective. The
guardian could also arrange for representative payment of
the ward's Social Security benefits, and thereby solve her
problem of chronic rent delinquency.
And much human misery is averted.





FROM: JoAnna Aniello, Assistant Deputy General Manager
for Operations
SUBJECT: TERMINATION OF TENANCY: MENTALLY
INCAPACITATED TENANT
I. PURPOSE
This General Management (GM) Directive expands upon
existing NYCHA practice regarding required notifications and
procedures staff must follow when terminating the tenancy of a
tenant who may be mentally incapacitated. It addresses
procedures to follow when it appears to the Housing Manager
that reasonable efforts to solve the problem, as detailed in the
NYCHA Management Manual, Chapter VII, Section II. A., have
been unsuccessful.
II. DEFINITION OF MENTAL INCAPACITY
For the purposes of this GM, a tenant may be mentally
incapacitated if it appears from a review of a tenant's file, or
from the personal knowledge of any Authority staff familiar with
the tenant, such as the Housing Manager, a Housing Assistant
or a social services worker, that as a result of mental disease or
defect, the tenant:
* may be unable to provide for his/her needs and is likely
to suffer harm or cause harm to others;
* is hospitalized for a serious psychiatric or psychological
disorder; or
* has exhibited seriously confused or disordered thinking
that may render him/her incapable of understanding
the termination of tenancy hearing process and
defending against the charges.
III. HOUSING MANAGER'S REFERRAL
When considering termination of tenancy and a tenant exhibits
behavior consistent with the above definition, the Manager shall:
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A. Submit a Management Referral for NYCHA Social Services,
NYCHA 040.450, to the Borough Social Service
Administrator, that requests a written evaluation of mental
capacity as well as a proposal for possible corrective action,
if feasible. The referral must indicate that the tenancy will
be subject to termination. The Housing Manager must not
forward the case to the Operations Services Department's
Tenancy Administration Division (OSTA) until after (s)he
receives a report from Social Services. The report must
indicate whether the tenant appears capable of
understanding the termination of tenancy hearing process
and responding to the charges, or whether a guardian or
other representative is required.
B. Enter the details of the referral, the receipt of the evaluation
and the date, if sent, that the case was sent to OSTA for
termination into the Termination of Tenancy Log.
C. Follow up with the Borough Social Services Administrator
after thirty (30) calendar days of the referral if no report has
been received.
D. When Social Services has completed its evaluation and
informs the Housing Manager that corrective action is not
feasible, the Housing Manager may submit the termination
case to OSTA in accordance with all current procedures.
When forwarding the case to OSTA the Housing Manager
shall:
1. Indicate on the Transmittal to OSTA, NYCHA 040.276,
that the tenant was referred to NYCHA Social Services
for an evaluation of mental capacity. Include the
results of the referral and the recommendation, if
applicable, to appoint a Guardian or other
representative to assist the Tenant with the
administrative hearing and other termination
procedures.
2. Attach a copies of the most recent Management Referral
for NYCHA Social Services, the corresponding Social
Services report and the Professional Consultant's
evaluation, if applicable.
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3. Attach copies of all applicable documents contained in
the tenant folder, including prior social service referrals
and social services evaluations.
4. In the Interview Record, NYCHA Form 040.006, detail
the reasons the case was submitted to Social Services,
i.e., describe the tenant's behavior and all relevant
information known about the tenant.
E. If the problem for which the Housing Manager made the
referral persists up to twelve (12) months after documented
Social Services intervention and the Housing Manager
determines that it is in the best interest of the Authority to
terminate the tenancy, no further evaluation by the Social
Services Division is needed before submitting the case to
OSTA. The steps outlined in Section D shall be followed
when forwarding the case to OSTA for termination. The
Housing Manager must also notify the Borough Social
Services Division that the case has been forwarded to OSTA
for termination.
IV. BOROUGH SOCIAL SERVICE DIVISION
The following details the procedure to follow when the Borough
Social Service Division receives a referral from a Housing
Manager that a tenant may be mentally incapacitated and is at
risk of termination.
A. Immediately upon receipt of a pending termination case of a
tenant who may be mentally incapacitated, the Borough
Social Services supervisory staff assigns the case to staff
who shall, within twenty (20) calendar days of being
assigned:.
1. Take appropriate steps needed to determine whether or
not the tenant is mentally incapacitated as defined in
Section II. If social services staff believes a psychiatric
evaluation and determination of mental capacity is
required, they must notify the Borough Social Services
Administrator, who shall refer the matter to a
Professional Consultant retained by the Housing
Authority. The Professional Consultant must complete
the evaluation and submit a report to the Borough
Social Services Administrator within 30 days. The
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report must indicate whether the appointment of a
guardian or other representative is necessary if
proceedings to terminate the tenancy would be
commenced within the next 180 days. If the report
indicates that the tenant is incompetent and unlikely to
benefit from corrective action, no further action shall be
taken by social services staff.
2. If 'the Professional Consultant's evaluation indicates
that the tenant is competent, the social services staff
worker shall submit a proposal detailing corrective
action that might assist in resolving the tenancy
problems. Reasonable corrective action may include
arranging for financial management, cleaning and/or
housekeeping services, communication with family
members or community-based social workers,
identification and request for the intervention of
community based case management services.
B. The Borough Social Services Administrator reviews the
evaluation and the Professional Consultant's report, and
reports the findings to the Housing Manager. If reasonable
corrective action is not feasible and termination must
proceed, the Borough Social Services Administrator must
notify the Housing Manager so that the file can be
forwarded to OSTA. When forwarding the Professional
Consultant's report to the Housing Manager, the Borough
Social Services Administrator shall attach a cover memo
addressed to the Assistant Director of OSTA that must
indicate whether or not the referred tenant appears to be
mentally incapacitated in accordance with the definition
specified in Section II, and whether the appointment of a
guardian or other representative is recommended by the
Professional Consultant.
V. TENANCY ADMINISTRATION DIVISION (OSTA)
OSTA staff must screen cases to determine whether the tenant
has been evaluated for mental capacity.
A. If the Social Services report recommends the appointment of
a guardian, OSTA shall then forward the case to the Law
Department for the purpose of obtaining a guardian. OSTA
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shall maintain a log of all cases forwarded to the Law
Department for the purpose of obtaining a guardian. OSTA
shall follow-up with the Law Department if a guardian has
not been obtained within 45 days of the referral to the Law
Department. As soon as the Law Department notifies OSTA
that a guardian has been appointed, OSTA shall forward the
case for termination to the Law Department's Tenant
Administrative Hearings Division (TAHD) or the Anti-
Narcotic Strike Force as appropriate.
B. In the event a termination case is received by OSTA in
which the tenant appears to be mentally incapacitated as
defined in Section II, or in which a referral was made to
Social Services but there is no report on mental capacity or
record of intervention, the proceeding to terminate the
tenancy shall cease. OSTA shall make a referral to Social
Services for an evaluation of mental capacity and return the
file to the Housing Manager. Social Services shall
determine the appropriateness of a psychological evaluation,
and if required, forward the request for an evaluation to the
Professional Consultant in accordance with the procedures
detailed in Section IV. A. and IV.B. above.
VI. TAHD/ANTI-NARCOTIC STRIKE FORCE & OFFICE OF
THE IMPARTIAL HEARING OFFICER
If at any time during the administrative hearing, either the
TAHD/Anti-Narcotic attorney or the Hearing Officer has reason
to suspect that the tenant may be mentally incapacitated, and
there has been no social service evaluation of the tenant's
condition, the hearing must be stayed, and the Law
Department/Hearing Office shall notify OSTA, detailing the
reasons for which the hearing was stayed, i.e., a description of
the tenant's behavior at the hearing and any other pertinent
information known about the tenant. OSTA will make a Social
Services referral, notify the Housing Manager, and follow up
with Social Services within 30 days if no report is received.
If a tenant or his/her representative seeks to re-open the default
at an administrative hearing on the ground of mental incapacity,
the tenant shall make an application to the Hearing Officer. If
the Hearing Officer grants the application, the case is referred to
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the tenant's housing development, to be referred for NYCHA
Social Services by the Housing Manager and processed in
accordance with the procedures detailed in Section IV.
